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On the Horizon
Editor: O. Sami Saydjari, ssaydjari@cyberdefenseagency.com

Trends in Process
Control Systems Security

T

he protection of critical infrastructure systems is a
hotly debated topic. The very label “critical infrastructure” implies that these systems are important,
and they are: they support our everyday lives, from

the water and food in our homes to our physical and financial
welfare. They also support industry
and government operation. Within
the US alone, critical infrastructures
include approximately 28,600 networked Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) institutions, 2
million miles of pipeline, 2,800
power plants (with 300,000 production sites), 104 nuclear power plants,
80,000 dams, 60,000 chemical plants,
87,000 food-processing plants, and
1,600 water-treatment plants.
In an effort to scope the issue, the
US National Strategy for Homeland
Security has identified 14 areas for
critical infrastructure protection,
most of which are privately owned:
agriculture, information and telecommunications, food energy,
water, transportation, public health,
finance and banking, emergency
services, chemical industry and hazardous materials, government, postal
and shipping, defense industrial
base, and national monuments and
icons. At the heart and soul of nearly
every one of these critical infrastructures is a process control system. PCSs
have existed for millennia: float regulator mechanisms for controlling
water levels, for example, date back
to Greece circa 300 BC. In the 1800s
and early 1900s, most control systems used relay and sequencer technologies; the most significant recent
development was the introduction

of programmable logic controllers
(PLCs) in the late 1960s.
This article explores the recent
evolution of PCSs and their environments, explains the need for improved security in these systems, and
describes some of the emerging research areas that offer promise in
PCS security.

The importance
of PCS availability
A PCS frequently used in critical infrastructures and factory automation is a supervisory, control, and
data acquisition (SCADA) system,
which monitors switches and
valves, controls temperature and
pressure conditions, and collects and
logs field data. A SCADA system
can continuously record and report
pressure data polled from an oil
pipeline, for example; if an alarm is
registered, the control-room operator can respond to the alarm and use
the system to investigate other parts
of the pipeline. SCADA systems also
monitor pipelines for total volumetric rate, to provide yield data. Additionally, these systems can sample
the produced fluids for specific
gravity, gas composition, and other
physical parameters as required.
SCADA systems typically monitor
and report these values to controlroom operators.
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SCADA systems specifically, and
PCSs in general, have tiers of computing capability—from powerful
workstations to PLCs to wired and
wireless sensors—with all the components networked together to provide the desired process control.
Such systems’ operational requirements vary by industry and application, but most requirements
typically include 24/7 availability,
real-time or near-real-time response, and, increasingly, remote
control. In terms of security primitives, security professionals typically
prioritize by confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For a PCS,
though, it’s availability, availability,
and availability: when you flip a light
switch, you expect the light to turn
on, and when you pick up a telephone, you expect a dial tone. In
some sectors, estimates of the cost of
downtime range from US$1 million
to $4 million per hour or US$25
million to $100 million per day.
Designers typically build PCSs
with fault-tolerant techniques such
as redundancy and minimal mean
time to repair, paying special attention to disaster recovery. For most
systems, harsh environments (such as
the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico for deep-sea wells) and natural
disasters (such as hurricanes and
earthquakes) pose the biggest
threats. The 1988 Piper Alpha explosion of an oil production platform in the North Sea, for example,
resulted in 167 deaths and substantial
financial losses. Since then, many oil
pipelines have been fitted with
emergency shutdown valves designed to close the pipeline at two or
more places in the event of major
breaks in the line or severe pressure
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Figure 1. Supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) system for an oil platform
with increasing use of remote control and connectivity to the rest of the enterprise.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs) monitor and
control offshore elements.

loss at one end. Many countries also
mandate regulatory oversight and
institute certification requirements
for new oil and gas wells. But why
isn’t the threat of computer attack
addressed equally?
To answer this question, we must
first look at the evolution of PCSs
and the environment in which they
operate. Initially, PCS data communication relied on proprietary protocols and operating systems, but over
time, standard Ethernet-based protocols offered several additional advantages: less training, increased
overall productivity, and reduced
costs. However, the flipside of this
standardization is an increased vulnerability to Ethernet-based attacks.
Furthermore, many PCS products
now include commercial off-theshelf software—for example, commercial operating systems and
database packages. This computing
environment promotes ease of use,
but it also renders PCSs susceptible
to myriad buffer-overflow vulnerabilities and other attack opportunities inherent in products such as
Microsoft Windows. Connectivity
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subnetwork with connectivity to the
rest of the enterprise (see Figure 2).2
The advantage is that the organization has access to production-line
output in real time, but the disadvantage is the potential for access by
disgruntled employees within the
organization and malicious outsiders
via the Internet.

■

has also significantly increased.
Whereas human operators initially
worked within the PCS’s “blast
zone” with its stand-alone network,
safety considerations have encouraged the use of remote control and
management, and a growing number of companies now control their
SCADA systems from offsite. Oil
production companies use remotely
controlled pipeline-isolation plugs,
for example, to seal pipelines for
planned shutdowns (routine repairs),
rerouting, adding valves, and so on.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical example,
with PLCs and remote terminal
units (RTUs) monitoring and controlling specific offshore infrastructure elements.1
SCADA systems, with various
communication links for redundancy and control-center management software, perform the system
monitoring between field and control centers. Communication links
can traverse the public Internet, thus
the threat space is literally the world.
Even in less hostile environments, such as manufacturing lines,
the PCS is frequently on its own
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Many studies have analyzed individual SCADA systems for reliability and
security,1,3,4 but it’s still an important
research area simply because its assets
are so critical. Several specific areas are
still ripe for further research.

Vulnerability assessments
and decision support
The number, speed, and sophistication of network attacks continue to
grow; naturally, this dynamic, yet escalating, threat environment requires a comprehensive approach to
security that also includes vulnerability and risk analyses. Many vulnerability assessments are just results
of a checklist’s completion; they
offer no assurance that the list is
comprehensive or that the PCS,
once it “passes the checklist,” is now
secure. We need a systematic
methodology that can apply to a variety of SCADA systems. Some initial work in this area has begun,5 but
much more is needed. Moreover,
these critical systems are large and
complex, which makes changes and
upgrades costly. Once we can identify and assess the vulnerabilities,
we’ll need a decision support system
to prioritize various strategies for
protection, mitigation, or recovery.

Network mapping
and interdependency
identification
A PCS’s networked nature is one of
its greatest strengths because it provides the opportunity for robustness,
while also allowing the possibility of
cascading failures. One of a critical
infrastructure’s most vulnerable layers is network access to its SCADA
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systems. To understand a dynamic
network architecture, we need tools
that facilitate network mapping—
tools that not only visualize node
topology and connectivity but also
provide information on types of
reachability as well as path dependence. In hardware, reachability can
be as simple as a link at the physical
layer and (in system terms) whether a
route allows a path to the system or
network. In software, reachability
can include the operating system or
program’s ability to make the necessary connections to the hardware or
network to “reach” the system.
Whether done directly through
routing or via a series of handoffs,
reachability opens vulnerabilities.
The research needed in this area is
more than a ping utility; automated
network analyses that can run in
background mode and provide
warnings if a security policy is violated would greatly assist SCADA
operations. Tool support through an
analysis of information flow between SCADA systems is also
needed—system security personnel
might want to restrict certain types
of packets in support of the organization’s security policy and not permit any “backdoor” mechanism for
those packets through indirect routing. Tools such as the prototype
Cayenne Network Analyzer are a
step in this direction.6
Infrastructures and their collective PCSs are often interdependent—the power grid, for example,
depends on oil and gas pipelines,
and oil and gas pipelines depend on
the power grid. Yet such systems’
vulnerabilities aren’t obvious; an attack on one infrastructure can cause
a failure in a seemingly unrelated
infrastructure. Moreover, each infrastructure is composed of multiple layers, from cyber to physical
system control; thus, a cyberattack
in one infrastructure could cause a
physical failure in another. Visualization tools could help operators
manage and monitor this complex
connectivity.
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Figure 2. Process control system (PCS) network for a manufacturing line. Frequently,
networks are located in isolated facilities with connectivity to the enterprise and,
ultimately, to the Internet through one or more firewalls.3 (HMI stands for humanmachine interface, and PLC stands for programmable logic controller.)

Modeling, simulation,
and experimentation
A PCS’s tiered structure requires a
multilayered model that can capture
identified vulnerabilities. Furthermore, to link the vulnerabilities between interdependent systems, the
modeler requires some notion of
causality. Once developed, the modeler could link the resulting
multilayered SCADA models to determine system interactions, and then
test, refine, and validate these models
and data through increasingly sophisticated experiments to discover and
record additional dependencies and
system interactions. Network con-

gestion control also has room for improvement. Promising work is under
way at the US National Infrastructure
for Simulation and Analysis Center
(NISAC; www.lanl.gov/orgs/d/nis
ac/) in its development of the Interdependent Energy Infrastructure
Simulation System (IEISS) tool and
the Water Infrastructure Simulation
Environment (WISE).

Distributed control
PCSs are naturally distributed, but
monitoring and control are often
centralized, and controllability is
limited to operations centers. With
the advent of intelligent distributed
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controllers, the rise in distributed
decision-making via network communication has broadened the available responses to infrastructure
changes due to natural failures or attack. However, controllers’ actions
must be cooperative so that they
don’t introduce negative network
effects on the system. Distributed algorithms govern these actions, so
they must also be fault-tolerant and
secure. Many PCSs are, in reality,
transportation networks; thus, flow
models and flow-balance algorithms
dominate the controllers. These algorithms can be made fault-tolerant
via executable runtime assertionchecking. The distributed coordination algorithms for a specific type of
controller for power systems, the
Flexible AC Transmission System
(FACTS), appear elsewhere.7

A recent survey analyzed cyberattack
incident reports collected from various infrastructure control systems.8
The study showed a fivefold increase
from 1994 to 2004 in the annual
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ith so many PCSs in private
hands, there is a very real reluctance to discuss vulnerabilities, but
the sharing of information is essential. One group aims to ease this fear:
the Process Control Systems Forum,
www.pcsforum.org. Although the
forum is a US Department of
Homeland Security initiative
launched in May 2005, it recognizes
that PCS security is a global issue that
requires a global solution, and international membership is invited and
encouraged. This open forum has
several subgroups, called interest
groups; one particular such group focuses on research. The Research Interest Group will maintain an open,
shared, and well-publicized Web site
(www.pcsf.org) to serve as a repository for control systems research
(with links to references and related
sites), raise awareness of control systems issues where further research is
needed, and encourage dialogue and
collaboration between industry,
academia, and government.

W

Full-spectrum
attack planning

Log on for free

control system incident rate. Another significant finding was a
change in the type of incident. For
the period between 1982 and 2001,
29 percent of the incidents were labeled as external, 50 percent as accidental, and 21 percent as internal.
However, from 2002 to 2004, 66
percent were classified as external, 22
percent were accidental, and only 3
percent were internal; the remaining
were categorized as unknown. We
need improved techniques for dealing with network attacks across the
entire spectrum, from real-time indications and pre-attack warnings to
trans-attack methods for survivability, denial, and consequence management to post-attack means for
attribution through digital forensics.
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